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BAR BRIEFS
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
School District vs. Shinn: Action against directors and treasurer
of school district, also State Bonding Fund, for alleged unlawful payment of school warrants. Warrants were for following items: tuition
in outside school districts, tuition in private schools within the district,
attorney fees to procure evidence for lawsuit. Sections 1161, 1165,
1168, 1170 and 1173 involved. Plaintiff's contention was that treasurer
must make sure that the warrant he pays is for a proper and lawful
purpose. HELD: Citing 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 597, "The object
of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
carry out the intention of the lawmakers." The primary rule is that
the intention is to be found in the language used. If a law is plain it
declares itself and nothing is left for interpretation. To interpret in
such case would practically invest, the judiciary with lawmaking power.
The treasurer has no authority respecting the allowance and approval of
bills. He is a ministerial officer. Without collusion shown, there is
no cause of action against the treasurer or the Bonding-Fund.
Estate of Druhl vs. Druhl: Appeal from an order permitting sale
of real estate belonging to estate of deceased. The real estate was
occupied as homestead. After the death of the father, who was the
owner, the widow remarried and moved with the children to Oregon.
The order directed the investment of the proceeds of sale until the
youngest child becomes of age, when division is to be made, one-third
to the mother and two-thirds to the children. HELD: Construing
Sections 5627, 5743, 8900 and 8901, Laws of 1913, "The right to take
the property under the law of distribution is not affected by the homestead estate when the property ceases to be a homestead. . The condition which would entitle the children to a homestead estate never
arose." The method of distribution is correct.
Baird as Receiver vs. Elevator Co.: A chattel mortgage was
signed by the mortgagor in the proper place, but, instead of signing
the receipt for copy, the mortgagor signed his name in the blank space
reserved for the Notary's signature to the acknowledgment. Question:
was this in compliance with the requirements of Section 6763 Laws of
1913? HELD: Distinguishing it from Stoffel vs. Sullivan, 49\N. D.
695, in which the receipt was printed in the body of the mortgage, "The
instrument shows a substantial compliance with the statute, and the
chattel mortgage was entitled to be filed; and having been so filed,
constituted constructive notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers." The mortgagor signed his name in a place where it could
not possibly have been intended for any purpose other than as a signature to such receipt.
THE NATURALIZATION DECISION
The case of U. S. vs. Macintosh, Sup. Ct. Rep. 51-570, is causing
as much of a furore as the Dred Scott decision. The applicant, a
Canadian and an ordained, Baptist minister, was denied admission on
the ground that he was not attached to the principles of the Constitution since he would not promise in advance to bear arms in defense
of the United States unless he believed the war to be morally justified.

BAR BRIEFS

The August Journal of the American Bar Association has a very
exhaustive review of the Supreme Court decision, which should be
studied as well as read.
Several criticisms that we have seen are of a most virulent type,
transgressing the limits of legitimate discussion, we believe.
In view of the fact that the Court stood five to four on the subject,
it may be acknowledged that there is ample justification for a difference of opinion among laymen as well as lawyers. That difference of
opinion, we feel, may even take the form of argumentation, bordering
on contention. That it should take the form of bitter, vitriolic, captious,
carping criticism in certain religious and quasi-religious journals does
not speak well for the tolerance of Christian practice as compared with
its teaching. Hard as it may be, at times, we should try to remain sane
in our critical analyses.
We quote two paragraphs from The Christian Century (June 10,
1931) :
"We refuse to accept the Constitution as interpreted by this
decision of the Supreme Court. Our conscience is not for sale. We
give to no government the power to conscript our religion. We refuse
to bow down and worship the State. We refuse to bear arms or to
aid in any way a war which we believe contrary to the will of God.
"This may be treason-it is not for us to say. But if it be treason,
let the defenders of tyranny make the most of it !"
RED FLAG STATUTES
In Stromberg vs. California, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532, the Supreme
Court of the United States construed the California "red flag" statute,
under which it is made a felony to display a red flag "as a sign, symbol
or emblem of opposition to organized government" or "as an invitation
or stimulus to anarchistic action" or "as an aid to propaganda of a
seditious character." The first clause was held invalid under the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution, and conviction "which may have rested
upon that clause exclusively, must be set aside." It appears, therefore,
from the decision that no matter what the known designs and purposes
of anarchists and communists may be, nor what effect the display of a
red flag may have upon those who know the designs and purposes of
these groups, peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal
means is not to be suppressed in this country. While the opinion of
the Chief Justice makes a sound and sensible distinction, it will require
an increase of vigilance on the part of patriotic citizens to counteract
the bad effects that are bound to result from the decision. The true
doctrine of the "red flag" party is still "the indispensability of a desperate, bloody, destructive war as the immediate task," and the show
of peaceful, legal opposition is contradicted by many known facts and
factors.
A LAWYER PAINTS HIS PICTURE
In the Law Society Journal for November, 1930, and February,
1931, we find an interesting word picture of the legal profession,
painted by a practitioner. At the risk of making his artistry look like
mere "daubs" we reproduce portions of the picture here.
"It is fair to say that there is neither rhyme nor reason in the
usual lawyer's bill and that the public is justified in screaming stridently
because though the figures may be right the demonstration is almost

